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A Comparative Historical Analysis of War
Time Procedural Protections and
Presidential Powers:
From The Civil War To The War on Terror
Kyndra Rotunda*
It was a new kind of war, and the U.S. faced a new kind of
enemy. Clandestine saboteurs operated in the shadows waiting
for the perfect opportunity to strike. Our country was not secure.
Our homeland was under siege. Our military hunted an enemy
it called “enemy combatants.” It brought some of these enemy
combatants before special Military Commissions instead of before
civilian criminal courts.
Public debate ensued about the
procedures that should be applied to these captured enemy
combatants. What was their status? What were their rights?
What should be their fate? U.S. courts, including the Supreme
Court, became embroiled in the controversy as it struggled to
answer these questions from on-high. The year was 1863. We
were at war—the Civil War.
Some say that the issues arising in the present-day War on
Terror are unprecedented, and that the procedures to deal with
captured enemy combatants are novel. In reality, there is
nothing new under the sun. Many of the legal issues arising in
the current War on Terror arose over one hundred years ago,
during the Civil War.
This article compares and contrasts the military trials that
brought the Lincoln conspirators to justice with the present day
Military Commissions.
It concludes that, over time, the
President and Congress, through statutes and treaties and
executive orders, have created procedural rules that extend more
rights to captured enemy soldiers today than would have been
imagined in Lincoln’s time.

* Kyndra Rotunda is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the
Military Personnel Law Center at Chapman University School of Law; Lecturer,
University of California, Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law, former Army JAG Corps
Officer [Major], and author of HONOR BOUND: INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS (Carolina
Academic Press 2008).
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There are important differences.
From Lincoln’s time
through FDR, Congress and the President together decided what
those rights would be. In modern times, the Court (even though
it is fiercely divided) has stood firm against the President, even
when he has the full support of Congress. And, the more things
change, the more they are the same. In the military trials of
Lincoln conspirators, and the trials of Nazi saboteurs during
World War II, there was what today we would call “unlawful
command influence.” That remains true today, by people who
claim to have the best interests of the detainees at heart.
In discussing modern day judicial branch involvement with
military trials, this article analyzes the role of the Supreme
Court vis-à-vis the President during a time of war.
In
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,1 the Supreme Court
made clear that a President’s executive authority is at its highest
when both the President and Congress act in concert, and at its
lowest when the President acts contrary to the will of Congress.2
Consistent with this test, in previous conflicts, the Supreme
Court has deferred to Congress and the Executive about wartime procedures, especially when the two branches agreed.
However, one unique feature of the current conflict is that the
Supreme Court has stepped in even when Congress and the
President were united. Thus, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court
invalidated the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which had
established procedures for detaining enemy combatants captured
abroad in the Global War on Terror.3
One feature of Military Commissions that has not changed
over the years is that Presidents have a tendency to interfere
with ongoing Military Commissions. For instance, during the
Civil War, President Johnson refused to follow the Military
Commission’s request for clemency in ordering one of the Lincoln
conspirators (Mary Surratt) to be hanged. During World War II,
FDR made clear that he would execute Nazi prisoners regardless
of what the Supreme Court decided. These earlier interferences
came before the Youngstown standard evolved. But, similar
infractions have occurred even after Youngstown. In the current
war, President Obama has unilaterally halted trials in
Guantanamo Bay, which contradicts existing federal law, the
Military Commissions Act of 2006.4

1
2
3
4

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 592.
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
10 U.S.C.A. § 948b (West 2006).
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According to the test that Justice Jackson’s concurring
opinion articulated in Youngstown, President Obama’s executive
authority is at its lowest ebb, because his decision to halt trials is
contrary to an existing federal statute (The Military
Commissions Act of 2006). Yet, he has halted the trials, which
not only runs afoul of Justice Jackson’s power analysis in
Youngstown, but may amount to unlawful command influence.
To see where we are today and to put the present situation
in perspective, let us first consider the role of Military
Commissions in the Civil War.
I. LINCOLN’S ASSASSINATION, BOOTH’S CO-CONSPIRATORS,
AND THE HUNTER COMMISSION
On April 14, 1865, actor John Wilkes Booth shouted, “Sic
simper tyranus!”5 as he vaulted from the box seating that overlooked the Ford’s Theater Stage. He had just assassinated
President Lincoln. But, he did not act alone and President
Lincoln was not the only target.
John Wilkes Booth had conspired with other Confederate
sympathizers to topple the federal government by assassinating
President Lincoln and other national leaders, including Vice
President Andrew Johnson, Secretary of State William H.
Seward and General Ulysses S. Grant.6 Booth succeeded, but by
some twist of fate, the other attackers were unsuccessful. One
would-be assassin, George Atzerdot, lost his nerve and retreated
before attacking Andrew Johnson. Another co-conspirator, Lewis
Powell, carried out the assault on William Seward and stabbed
Seward multiple times. But, Seward miraculously survived.
General Grant fortuitously canceled his plans to attend the
Ford’s Theatre Production with the Lincolns, where he would
have faced the same fate as Abraham Lincoln.7
Booth escaped through the rear door of the theater, where he
took his horse’s reins from a stage-hand named Peanuts and
disappeared into the Washington darkness and across the
Potomac River.8 Later, Union troops would corner Booth in a
5 W.P. CAMPBELL, THE ESCAPE AND WANDERINGS OF J. WILKES BOOTH UNTIL
ENDING OF THE TRAIL BY SUICIDE IN OKLAHOMA, TRAVELERS SER. NO. 7 (1922), available
at http://ia341037.us.archive.org/1/items/johnwilkesboothe00camp/
johnwilkesboothe00camp.pdf.
6 Edward Steers, Jr., Introduction to THE TRIAL: THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS XI, XI (Edward Steers, Jr. ed., 2003)
[hereinafter THE TRIAL].
7 Id.
8 HARLOD HOLZER, THE PRESIDENT IS SHOT: THE ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 100, 118, 123 (2004), available at http://www.highlightskids.com/Lincoln/pdfs/
PresidentisShot.pdf.
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Maryland farm-house barn and he would surrender his life for
his crime. Booth’s final words were, “Say to my mother that I
died for my country.”9 But his co-conspirators would face a
military court —a Military Commission.
Within a few weeks of Lincoln’s assassination the
government had arrested eight suspects.10 On May 1, 1865,
President Johnson, by Executive Order, established a Military
Commission to try eight suspected co-conspirators in the
assassination of President Lincoln.11 One of them was a woman
named Mary Surratt.12 She owned a guest-house where the
conspirators allegedly met and hatched their plot.13
The Military Commission that heard the case of Booth’s
eight co-conspirators was comprised of nine military officers,
headed by the Army Judge Advocate General (JAG).14 It came to
be known as the “Hunter Commission,” named after its ranking
member Major General David Hunter.15
The Commission
established its own procedural rules with a few guiding
principles established by President Johnson. The President
ordered that the “trials be conducted with all diligence consistent
with the ends of justice.”16 The Order also required “the said
Commission to sit without regard to hours.”17 He said the orders
should “avoid unnecessary delay, and conduce to the ends of
public justice.”18
The Hunter Commission rules consisted of eleven succinct
points that ranged from providing prisoners some procedural

9 Id. at 155; James Speed, U.S. Attorney General, Opinion on the Constitutional
Power for the Military to Try and Execute the Assassins of the President, July, 1865, in
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS 403,
409 (Benn Pitman, comp., 1865) [hereinafter THE ASSASSINATION].
10 The eight co-conspirators were David Herold, Mary Surratt, Lewis Powell, Edman
Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Michael O’Laughlen, George Atzerodt, and Samuel Mudd. The
ninth conspirator, John Surratt Junior remained at large. Steers, supra note 6, at XII.
11 Proceedings of a Military Commission, May 1, 1865, in THE ASSASSINATION,
supra note 9, at 17.
12 While in prison, and during the Military Commission, Mary Surratt received
some special privileges because of her gender. She was not shackled in court, as the other
prisoners were, and she was allowed to choose which foods she would eat. The male
conspirators were shackled in court (two of them also wore a seventy-five pound ball
around their ankles), and the male conspirators were fed only military rations. OSBORN
H. OLDROYD, THE ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: FIGHT, PURSUIT, CAPTURE, AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CONSPIRATORS 119–20, 132 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001).
13 HOLZER, supra note 8, at 70.
14 Proceedings of a Military Commission, supra note 11, at 17.
15 See ROBERT AITKEN & MARILYN AITKEN, LAW MAKERS, LAW BREAKERS AND
UNCOMMON TRIALS 77 (2007).
16 Proceedings of a Military Commission, supra note 11, at 17.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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protections, to specifying petty details, such as what time they
would break for lunch each day. The rules were as follows:
1. The Commission would convene daily at 10 A.M., recess at 1.P.M.
for an hour.
2. The prisoners would be allowed legal counsel, who would take an
oath prescribed by Congress before being permitted to appear.
3. The examination of witnesses would be conducted on the part of
the Government by one Judge Advocate, and by counsel on the
part of the prisoners.
4. The testimony would be taken in short-hand by reporters, who
would take an oath that they would “record the evidence faithfully
and truly.” They would also be required to swear that they would
not communicate any part of the proceedings of trial, except by
authority of the presiding officer.
5. A copy of the evidence would be taken each day and given to the
Judge Advocate General, and one to the prisoners’ lawyers.
6. Only official reporters would be admitted to the court-room. The
rule specified that the Judge Advocate General would furnish
daily, at his discretion, to an agent for the Associated Press, “a
copy of such testimony and proceedings as may be published,
pending the trial, without injury to the public and the ends of
justice. All other publication of the evidence and proceedings is
forbidden, and will be dealt with as contempt of Court, on the part
of all persons or parties concerned in making or procuring such
publication.”19 [Ultimately, the testimony of three witnesses was
taken in secret session.20]
7. The presiding officer would furnish a pass to those permitted to
attend the trial. No person without a pass would be allowed into
the trial.
8. The argument of any motion, unless otherwise ordered by the
Court, would be limited to five minutes for each side.
9. After the argument was closed, the Court would immediately
deliberate and make its decision.
10. The Provost Marshal would ensure the prisoners attended the
trial, and would be responsible for their security. Their lawyers
could have access to them in the presence, but not in hearing, of a
guard.
11. Counsel for the prisoners would be required to “immediately
furnish” a list of defense witnesses.21

While the Commission allowed the defendants to have legal
counsel, it only gave them a few days to find lawyers. All of the

19
20
21

Steers, supra note 6, at 21.
Id.
Id.
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defendants managed to find lawyers, but some were not able to
appear by the time the trial started.22 These lawyers came later,
after the trial had already begun.23
For instance, testimony began in the trial on May 12th but it
was not until the next day, May 13th, that Reverdy Johnson
(counsel for Mary Surratt) appeared in court and was
unprepared.24 He said:
I am here at the instance of that lady [pointing to Mrs.
Surratt], whom I never saw until yesterday, and never heard
of, she being a Maryland lady, and thinking that I could be of
service to her, protesting, as she has done, her innocence to
me. Of the facts I know nothing, because I deemed it right, I
deemed it due to the character of the profession to which I
belong, and which is not inferior to the noble profession of
which you are a member, that she should not go undefended. I
knew I was to do it voluntarily, without compensation; the law
prohibits me from receiving compensation; but if it did not,
understanding her condition, I should never have dreamed of
refusing upon the ground of her inability to make
compensation.25

The trial was, for all intents and purposes, secret. The
Commission controlled what information was released to the
public. Only approved reporters were allowed to attend the
trials, and at the end of each day, the Commission specified what
information the reporters could report.26
Additionally, the
Commission closed the trial on three distinct occasions, to take
testimony from three Government witnesses.27
The Military Commission charged the defendants with
conspiracy to murder President Lincoln, and other members of
his administration including Vice President Andrew Johnson,
Secretary of State William H. Seward and Ulysses S. Grant,

22 OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 127. Mary Surratt obtained a very able defense
lawyer, Reverdy Johnson. He was a former attorney general, a sitting U.S. Senator and
he went on to hold the post of minister to Great Britain from 1868–1869. Lawyers for the
other defendants were also distinguished. One was a Congressman from Maryland, and
two others went on to become judges. Steers, supra note 6, at XVIII; Thomas Reed
Turner, The Military Trial, in THE TRIAL, supra note 6, at XXI, XXVI.
23 OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 127.
24 See id.; Douglas Linder, The Trial of the Lincoln Conspirators 6 (Univ. Mo. at
Kan. City Sch. of Law), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023004.
25 OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 127–28 (emphasis added).
26 See James H. Johnston, Swift and Terrible: A Military Tribunal Rushed to
Convict after Lincoln’s Murder, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2001, at F1; Trial of the Assassins,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1865, at 1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?_r=1&res=9903E6DC1E3DE53BBC4E52DFB366838E679FDE.
27 Proceedings of a Military Commission, supra note 11, at 21 n.* (unnumbered).
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Lieutenant General of the Army of the United States.28 The
prosecution maintained that the Lincoln conspirators were part
of a much larger conspiracy orchestrated by the President of the
Confederacy, Jefferson Davis in 1864.29 It said that Davis had
deployed Confederate Secret Service agents to Canada to disrupt
the war efforts and demoralize U.S. citizens. Davis’ plans
involved attacking civilian populations, burning northern cities,
bombing factories and ships, and using germ warfare to infect
the civilian population. Prosecutors presented the testimony of
three government witnesses that linked Booth and his
conspirators to Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Secret
Service.30
Although not required under the rules, the military hooded
the prisoners with gray wool hoods that tied at their neck and
had a small opening for their mouths. The prisoners were
hooded twenty-four hours a day, except for when they were in
court and it was in session.31 Eventually (around June 6, 1865,

Id. at 18–19. The charges read:
For maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously, and in aid of the existing armed
rebellion against the United States of America, on or before the 6th day of
March, A.D. 1865, and on divers other days between that day and the 15th day
of April, A.D. 1865, combining, confederating, and conspiring together with one
John H. Surratt, John Wilkes Booth, Jefferson Davis, George N. Sanders,
Beverly Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, Clement C. Clay, George
Harper, George Young, and others unknown, to kill and murder, within the
Military Department of Washington, and within the fortified and intrenched
lines thereof, Abraham Lincoln, late, and at the time of said combining,
confederating, and conspiring, President of the United States of America, and
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof; Andrew Johnson, now
Vice-President of the United States aforesaid; William H. Seward, Secretary of
State of the United States aforesaid; and Ulysses S. Grant, Lieutenant-General
of the Army of the United States aforesaid, then, in command of the Armies of
the United States, under the direction of the said Abraham Lincoln; and in
pursuance of and in prosecuting said malicious, unlawful, and traitorous
conspiracy aforesaid, and in aid of said rebellion, afterward, to-wit, on the 14th
day of April, A.D. 1865, within the Military Department of Washington
aforesaid, and within the fortified and intrenched lines of said Military
Department, together with said John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt,
maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously murdering the said Abraham Lincoln,
then President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, as aforesaid; and maliciously, unlawfully, and
traitorously assaulting, with intent to kill and murder, the said William H.
Seward, then Secretary of State of the United States, as aforesaid; and lying in
wait with intent maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously to kill and murder
the said Andrew Johnson, then being Vice-President of the United States; and
the said Ulysses S. Grant, then being Lieutenant-General, and in command of
the Armies of the United States, as aforesaid.

28

Id.
29

Edward Steers, Jr., General Conspiracy, in THE TRIAL, supra note 6, at XXIX–

30
31

Id. at XXX–XXXV.
OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 120.

XXX.
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or roughly six weeks after their capture), the Judge in charge of
the Military Commissions decided that the prisoners were
suffering too greatly from the hooding and ordered the guards to
remove the prisoners’ hoods.32
The trial lasted for nearly two months, and included
testimony from hundreds of witnesses. Together, the defense
and prosecution subpoenaed 483 witnesses and examined 361 of
them at trial.33 The trial transcript exceeded 4,500 pages and
stood over twenty-six inches tall.34
According to these
transcripts, members of the Commission visited the crime scene
where Booth shot President Lincoln.35 It also briefly recessed the
trial in order to survey the sanity of one defendant, Lewis
Payne.36 At another point in the trial, defendant Mary Surratt
developed “severe sickness” and was taken from the courtroom.
However, it appears from the trial transcript that the trial
continued in her absence.37
The Military Commission ultimately convicted all eight
conspirators. The Commission sentenced four defendants to
prison terms and four (Herold, Atzerodt, Payne and Surratt) to
death by hanging within two days of the verdict.38
It
recommended clemency for defendant Mary Surratt, based on her
age (she was almost forty-two years old) and her gender.
President Johnson refused to grant her clemency, and insisted
that she be hung for her role in the conspiracy. He said that she
“kept the nest that hatched the egg.”39
Hours before Mary Surratt was to face the gallows, her
lawyer filed an emergency writ of habeas corpus. The basis of
Surratt’s habeas petition, like petitions filed today, sought to
defeat the jurisdiction of the Commission by appealing to the
Constitution. Surratt’s petition argued that she was a private
citizen of the United States, in no manner connected with the
Armed Forces, who had not crossed enemy lines and who had not
32 THOMAS REED TURNER, BEWARE THE PEOPLE WEEPING: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE
ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 148–49 (1991).
33 TRIAL OF THE ALLEGED ASSASSINS AND CONSPIRATORS AT WASHINGTON CITY, D.C.,
MAY AND JUNE 1865, FOR THE MURDER OF PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN 16 (T.B.
Peterson & Bros. 1865) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE ASSASSINS AT WASHINGTON].
34 Id.
35 Id. at 47 (noting that on May 16, 1865, “the Court paid an informal visit, at half
past nine o’clock this morning, to the scene of the President’s assassination. The visit was
made at the suggestion of the Judge Advocate-General . . . ”).
36 Id. at 155.
37 Id. at 166.
38 LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 66 (2005).
39 See Joseph M. Perillo, Screed for a Film and Pillar of Classical Contract Law:
Shuey v. United States, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 922–23 (2002).
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committed any war crime. As a private citizen, she alleged, she
was entitled to an open public trial, before a jury, in a U.S.
Criminal Court and not before a military tribunal. For these
reasons, her petition argued that the Military Commission was
unlawfully convened and that the court could not allow the
Commission’s judgment to stand.40
The Court ordered the military to produce the defendant
Surratt and answer the writ. But, the Military did not comply
and instead presented an Executive Endorsement, dated that
very morning, July 7, 1865, 10.a.m., drafted and signed by
President Johnson. It suspended the writ of habeas corpus.41
The Judge deferred to President Johnson’s suspension of the
writ, stating: “This Court finds it powerless to take any further
action in the premises, and therefore declines to make orders
which would be vain for any practical purpose.”42 The Court
went on to state: “The Court has no further power in the
case . . . for if the petitioner be executed this day, as designed, the
body cannot be brought into Court, and therefore is an end to the
case.”43 Just a few hours later, the United States hanged Mary
Surratt and the other three defendants.44 The executions, of
course, mooted further appeals.
II. LAW GOVERNING MILITARY TRIBUNALS: FROM THE
REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE CIVIL WAR
At the time of the trial of the Lincoln conspirators, America
was a young country, less than 100 years old. While the country
was young, its experience with Military Commissions was not. It
had previously used Military Commissions to try war criminals
during the War of Independence. In 1780, George Washington
used Military Commissions (then called the “Court of Inquiry”) to
try British intelligence officer John Andre for spying.45
Americans captured Major Andre, who was out of uniform,

Fisher, supra note 38, at 209–10.
The endorsement stated:
To Major General W.S. Hancock, Commander, &c.—I, Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, do hereby declare that the writ of habeas
corpus has been heretofore suspended in such cases as this, and I do hereby
especially suspend this writ, and direct that you proceed to execute the order
heretofore given upon the judgment of the Military Commission, and you will
give this order in return to the writ. Andrew Johnson, President.
TRIAL OF THE ASSASSINS AT WASHINGTON, supra note 33, at 210.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See OLDROYD, supra note 12, at 205.
45 MAROUF HASIAN, IN THE NAME OF NECESSITY: MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE
LOSS OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 40 (2005).
40
41
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dressed in civilian clothes, and carrying documents (which were
stuffed inside his boots) from West Point Commandant, Benedict
Arnold.46 The documents revealed that Benedict Arnold was
conspiring with British Forces to surrender West Point in
exchange for a bribe.47
General George Washington’s fourteen member court of
inquiry faced the question of whether to try Major Andre as a
soldier, or a spy.48 It found sufficient evidence to treat him as a
spy and it concluded that he should suffer death.49 Major Andre
appealed to General Washington and urged Washington to view
him instead as a common soldier. Andre claimed that he had not
been behind enemy lines, but instead was traveling on “neutral
ground,” a fact he believed was dispositive in whether he was a
soldier or a spy, and thereby subject to a Military Commission.50
General Washington maintained that Andre was a spy because
he substituted civilian clothes for his military uniform and
adopted an assumed name.51 Major Andre was hanged on
October 2, 178052 about two weeks after American soldiers had
captured him.53
General Andrew Jackson also used Military Commissions,
both during the War of 1812 and during the Indian War in
1818.54 Jackson imposed martial law in New Orleans, which
included restrictions on civilians leaving the city and a curfew.55
One defendant was acquitted by a Military Commission, in part
because he maintained that the Commission did not have
jurisdiction to try him because he was a civilian. Jackson
disagreed with the acquittal and refused to release the
defendant. The defendant, despite having won acquittal by the
Military Commission, remained in jail.56
The United States built on these historical precedents when
it created Military Commissions during the Civil War.
Beginning in 1863, Union forces used Military Commissions to

Id. at 35–40; FISHER, supra note 38, at 11.
FISHER, supra note 38, at 11.
HASIAN, supra note 45, at 40.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
FISHER, supra note 38, at 11–12.
HASIAN, supra note 45, at 44.
53 Id. at 44 (noting that Major Andre was captured on September 21, 1780; that the
Board of Inquiry decided to treat him as a spy on September 29, 1780; and that it hanged
Major Andre on October 2, 1780).
54 John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 83, 89 (2006).
55 FISHER, supra note 38, at 25.
56 Id. at 25–26.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
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try Confederate spies found in Union ranks.57
Military
Commissions tried approximately 2,000 cases during the Civil
War, and went on to try another 200 cases during
Reconstruction.58
While the notion of using Military Commissions during war
was not unprecedented, President Johnson received criticism for
trying U.S. civilians before military courts.59 Did not their status
as U.S. civilians entitle them to trial before U.S. civilian courts?
U.S. Attorney General, James Speed, prepared a legal opinion for
President Johnson on the Constitutional Power of the Military to
Try and Execute the Assassins of the President.60 In that opinion,
he differentiated between open, active participants who wear
uniforms, and secret but active participants who operate as spies
and do not wear uniforms. He considered open participants to be
legitimate combatants and secret participants to be illegitimate
combatants—”enemy belligerents.”61 It is interesting that one
hundred forty years later, the U.S. uses the same definition,
though some people say that the term originated with the Bush
administration, but the history dates to the Civil War.62
While Attorney General Speed may have been the first
American to refer to detainees who violated the laws of war as
“enemy belligerents” or “enemy combatants,” the notion of
treating enemy soldiers who refuse to follow the laws of war
differently from those who do follow the laws of war was not,
even then, a novel concept. To reach his conclusions, Speed cited
to writings by Cicero and also to Wheaton’s Elements of
International Law, which drew distinctions between legitimate
combatants and illegitimate combatants. Speed concluded that
“[t]hese banditti that spring up in a time of war are respecters of
no law, human or divine, of peace or of war, are hostes humani
generis, and may be hunted down like wolves.”63 Though not
required, the military can opt to take banditti prisoners and
57
58

1920).

Id. at 50–51.
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 834, 853 (2d ed. rev. & enl.

59 Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: A Concise History, 101 AM. J. INT’L LAW
35, 40 (2007).
60 Speed, supra note 9, at 403.
61 Id. at 404–05. Speed also referred to these enemy belligerents interchangeably as
“banditti,” “public enemies,” “secret foes,” and “spies.” Id. at 405–07.
62 See Megan Gaffney, Boumediene v. Bush: Legal Realism and the War on Terror,
44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 197 (2009); Daniel Williams, After the Gold Rush—Part I:
Hamdi, 9/11, and the Dark Side of Enlightenment, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 341, 408 (2007);
Jules Lobel, The Preventative Paradigm & The Perils of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1407, 1420–21 (2007); Daniel Nasaw, Obama Administration to Abandon Bush term
“Enemy Combatants,” THE GUARDIAN, March 13, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/mar/13/enemy-combatant-guantanamo-detainees-obama.
63 Speed, supra note 9, at 406.
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punish them by military tribunals for “any infraction of the laws
of war.”64 He opined that:
[S]urely no lover of mankind, no one that respects law and order, no
one that has the instinct of justice, or that can be softened by mercy,
would, in time of war, take away from the commanders the right to
organize military tribunals of justice, and especially such tribunals for
the protection of persons charged or suspected with being secret foes
and participants in the hostilities.65

He argued that Booth’s statement after assassinating Lincoln
“sic simper tyrranis” and Booth’s dying statement, “[s]ay to my
mother that I died for my country,” illustrated that Booth (and
his co-conspirators) was not “an assassin from private malice, but
that he acted as a public foe.”66
Attorney General Speed’s opinion differentiating prisoners of
war (POWs) and non-POW enemy combatants was not only
backed by historical precedent, but it also reflected what was
already actually happening on the Civil War battlefield. General
Order Number 100 specified that enemy soldiers captured in
uniform were treated as prisoners of war.67 Spies, defined as “a
person who secretly, in disguise or under false pretense, seeks
information with the intention of communicating it to the
enemy,” were not treated as POWs and were punishable by
death, regardless of whether the spy successfully communicated
the information.68 Similarly:
[A] messenger or agent who attempts to steal through the territory
occupied by the enemy, to further in any manner the interests of the
enemy, if captured, is not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of
war, and may be dealt with according to the circumstances of the
case.69

Did it matter that civilian courts remained open? According
to Attorney General Speed, the fact that civilian courts remained
open was not dispositive on whether Lincoln’s assassins could be
tried by Military Tribunals.70
He concluded that military
tribunals can operate when civil courts are open for the limited
purpose of trying “offenders and offenses against the laws of
war.”71 Speed explained:
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 409.
67 Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Order No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, § 3, nos. 49, 56, 63, in THE ASSASSINATION, supra
note 9, at 410, 413–14.
68 Id. § 5, no. 88, at 416.
69 Id. § 5, no. 100, at 416.
70 Speed, supra note 9, at 409.
71 Id. at 407.
64
65
66
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The fact that the civil courts [i.e. Article III courts] are open
does not affect the right of the military tribunal to hold as a
prisoner and to try. The civil courts have no more right to
prevent the military, in a time of war, from trying an offender
against the law of war than they have a right to interfere with
and prevent a battle. . . . If the persons charged have offended
against the laws of war, it would be as palpably wrong for the
military to hand them over to the civil courts, as it would be
wrong in a civil court to convict a man of murder who had, in a
time of war, killed another in battle.72

United States Supreme Court precedent at the time
supported Speed’s view of the issue. In Ex parte Vallandigham,
the Supreme Court refused to hear a case challenging the
conviction of a U.S. citizen and resident of Ohio by Military
Commission, on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction.73 It said
that Vallandigham’s petition was not “within the letter or spirit
of the grants of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.”74
The Court deferred entirely to the Military Commission, finding
that it had no original jurisdiction to review, reverse, or revise
proceedings of Military Commissions.75
The defendant, Clement L. Vallandigham was a trial lawyer
and a former Ohio Congressman. Vallandigham’s crime was
sympathizing with the South and uttering “disloyal sentiments”
in a public speech.76 For instance, he called the Civil War
“wicked, cruel and unnecessary” and said it was waged “for the
purpose of crushing our liberty” and that it was a “war for the
freedom of the blacks and enslavement of the whites . . . .”77
Vallandigham ably represented himself at his trial, and
insisted that the Military Commission lacked jurisdiction to try
him. He maintained that only a civilian court would have
jurisdiction over him.78 The Military Commission disagreed with
his argument, found him guilty, and ordered Vallandigham to be
confined in a military prison for the remainder of the war.79
Three days after the Commission found Vallandigham guilty and
sentenced him, President Lincoln commuted Vallandigham’s
sentence, and ordered his troops to release Vallandigham outside

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 409.
Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 254 (1863).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 253.
FISHER, supra note 38, at 56–58.
Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 244–45 (1863).
FISHER, supra note 38, at 57.
Id.
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In effect, Lincoln deported

III. LAW GOVERNING MILITARY TRIBUNALS:
RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH WWII
In 1866, the year after the Hunter Commission tried and
convicted Lincoln’s assassins, and after the Civil War was over,
the Supreme Court revisited the question of whether and when
the law required civilian defendants to be tried by civilian
authorities during a time of war. In Ex parte Milligan,81 the
Supreme Court drew a line to clarify which cases could come
before Military Commissions.
The case involved Lambdin P. Milligan.82 Union forces
arrested him in 1864, in Indiana, for crimes of conspiracy.83 It
charged Milligan with joining and aiding a secret society known
as the “Order of American Knights” or “Sons of Liberty.”84 This
secret society aimed to overthrow the government and it
conspired with the enemy to seize war supplies and to liberate
prisoners of war, among other violations.85 Milligan was not a
Confederate soldier and Indiana was not at war with the Union.86
He had not been behind enemy lines.
Consistent with President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas
corpus, a Military Commission found Milligan guilty and
sentenced him to death.87 He filed for a writ of habeas corpus.
Eventually his case reached the Supreme Court in 1866, after the
Civil War was over.88 The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 decision,
held that Military Commissions could not try civilians, who had
not associated with the enemy and were “nowise connected with
military service,”89 if the civilian courts were open.90 In setting
out this distinction, the Court left open the possibility that
Milligan could have been tried by Military Commission for his
war crimes if deemed an enemy combatant—that is, if he had

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
Id. at 107.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 107.
FISHER, supra note 38, at 58.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 118–27.
Id.
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associated with the enemy91 or if he were in some way connected
with military service.92 The Court stated:
On her soil [in Indiana, where the defendant was arrested],
there was no hostile foot; if once invaded, that invasion was at
end, and with it all pretext for martial law. Martial law
cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must
be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually
closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.93

Milligan had never been in the military, had no connection to the
military or the state militia, and had never been in any state
involved in the rebellion.
The minority opined that Congress “had power, though not
exercised, to authorize the Military Commission which was held
in Indiana.”94 In a reference to Lincoln’s assassination and the
conviction of eight conspirators, the Supreme Court dissenters in
Milligan deferred to the Executive authority. It stated that the
Military Commission “was approved by [President Lincoln’s]
successor [President Andrew Johnson] in May, 1865, and the
sentence was ordered to be carried into execution.
The
proceedings therefore had the fullest sanction of the executive
department of the government.”95
Congress regarded the Supreme Court decision in Milligan
as an act of judicial lawmaking and, in 1867, responded to what
it regarded as an activist court, by limiting the Court’s
jurisdiction to hear cases involving military law.96
Some commentators argue that Milligan prohibited civilians
from ever being tried before Military Commissions, so long as
civilian courts were open.97 Others maintain that the test in
Milligan is not such a simple one and that it would permit the
military to try civilian enemy belligerents before Military
Commissions.98 Many years later, during World War II, the
91 Yoo, supra note 54, at 90 (“By implication, if Milligan had been an enemy
combatant, not a civilian, a military commission could have tried him for war crimes.”).
92 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 122.
93 Id. at 126–27.
94 Id. at 137 (Chase, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
95 Id. at 132.
96 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432, 433; Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional
Power to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts in School Busing, 64 GEO.
L.J. 839 (1976).
97 See David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 1028 (2008); Gregory H. Shill, Enemy Combatants and a
Challenge to the Separation of War Powers in al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir.
2007), 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 398–99 (2008).
98 See Yoo, supra note 54, at 90 (“By implication, if Milligan had been an enemy
combatant, not a civilian, a military commission could have tried him for war crimes.”);;
al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 301 (2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part,

ROTUNDA

464

10/14/2009 6:37 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 12:449

Supreme Court, in Ex parte Quirin,99 agreed with the later view.
That is, it made clear that enemy belligerents (including a U.S.
citizen) can be tried before Military Commissions even when
civilian courts are open. It made clear that Milligan is narrow.
The Quirin Case considered whether Nazi saboteurs could be
tried before Military Commissions. The year was 1942, and the
United States was at war with the German Reich. Only six
months after the attack on Pearl Harbor,100 eight German
saboteurs boarded two submarines in French ports, and began
their trip to the United States.101 Hidden under miles of dark
water, they made the journey across the Atlantic ocean
undetected.102 At least one of them was a U.S. citizen.103
Their submarines came ashore in the middle of the night,
under the cover of darkness.104 One landed in New York, the
other in Florida.105 Each four-man team unloaded explosives,
fuses, and timing devices.106 Some wore German uniforms.107
They buried their uniforms in the sand, and dressed as civilians
in order to blend-in and escape detection.108 At this point, they
became spies, unprivileged combatants under the laws of war.
Roving among unsuspecting civilians, they began surveying
buildings.109 Their plan was to attack the United States, from
within its own borders.110
Within days of coming ashore, they contacted two
Americans.111 They met for drinks and discussion with one of
dissenting in part) (stating and explaining that the principles of Milligan do not apply
because al-Marri “plainly qualifies as an enemy combatant.”). See also Christina D.
Elmore, An Enemy Within Our Midst: Distinguishing Combatants From Civilians in the
War Against Terrorism, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 213, 221–22 (2008) (discussing proponents of
both views). See also Ex Parte Quirin, in which defendant Hans Haupt argued that
Milligan stood for the proposition that his U.S. citizenship insulated him from trial before
Military Commission. 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942). The Supreme Court settled that question in
the Quirin case and decided that the Milligan case would allow enemy belligerents, who
had taken an active part in hostilities, to face trial before a military tribunal. Id. at 45–
46. Therefore, citizenship and whether civilian courts were open were not dispositive.
99 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
100 On the morning of December 7, 1941, the Japanese navy launched a stealth
attack against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, which resulted in
the United States becoming militarily involved in World War II. H.P. WILLMOTT, THE
SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST 68 (Smithsonian Books 2002) (1999).
101 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 20.
104 Id. at 21.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See FISHER, supra note 38, at 35.
110 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
111 See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 5 (1945); Haupt v. United States, 330
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them, Anthony Cramer.112 However, even years later it remains
unclear whether Cramer knew of their plan or whether he helped
them carry it out. The other American was Hans Haupt, whose
son was one of the saboteurs.113
On the verge of their planned attacks, one of the saboteurs
lost his nerve and decided to abandon the plan.114 He took a
train to Washington, D.C., intending to confess.115 After a long
wait, he met with officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and informed them of the plan.116 However, when FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover announced their capture, he left out the
untidy fact that the FBI only knew about the plan because of the
voluntary admission of one of the participants.117 Instead,
Hoover credited the FBI’s investigatory powers for discovering
the saboteurs.118 The trials were held in secret.119 If they had
been public, the entire nation would have known that the FBI
caught the saboteurs by accident.120 The Nazis would have
known that this plan failed by happenstance, and they would
have been more likely to try to infiltrate saboteurs again.121
The United States tried and convicted Cramer for treason,
but the Supreme Court later reversed that conviction.122 Hans
Haupt was also tried.123 He had provided shelter and a car for
his saboteur son and, unlike Cramer, definitely knew about the
plan.124 The United States convicted him for providing shelter,
sustenance and supplies, and the Supreme Court upheld his

U.S. 631, 634 (1947).
112 See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 5.
113 Haupt, 330 U.S. at 632.
114 FISHER, supra note 38, at 93.
115 Id.
116 See Morris D. Davis, The Influence of Ex Parte Quirin and Courts-Martial on
Military Commissions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 121, 122 (2008).
117 Tony Mauro, A Mixed Precedent for Military Tribunals, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 19,
2001, at 15.
118 Id.
119 Charles Lane, Liberty and the Pursuit of Terrorists, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2001,
at B1 (“The trial was held in secret not only to protect legitimate intelligence sources and
methods, but also to conceal the embarrassing fact that J. Edgar Hoover's FBI had failed
to uncover the plot until one of the Germans came to Washington and offered a detailed
confession.”).
120 Id.
121 LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. RL31340, MILITARY
TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 3–4 (2002).
122 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 48 (1945).
123 Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 632 (1947).
124 Id. at 633 (“Sheltering his son, assisting him in getting a job, and in acquiring an
automobile, all alleged to be with knowledge of the son’s mission, involved defendant in
the treason charge.”);; Cramer, 325 U.S. at 3 (“There was no evidence, and the
Government makes no claim, that he had foreknowledge that the saboteurs were coming
to this country or that he came into association with them by prearrangement.”).
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conviction.125 The government tried Cramer and Hans Haupt in
Civilian Article III Courts.126
The government tried the saboteurs in military courts—
including the U.S. citizen saboteur.127 The U.S. citizen (the son
of Hans Haupt) had been behind enemy lines, unlike Hans Haupt
and unlike Mr. Milligan. A war crime tribunal convicted the
saboteurs of the following crimes: (1) Violating the laws of war;
(2) Relieving or attempting to relieve, or corresponding with or
giving intelligence to, the enemy; (3) Spying; and (4) Conspiracy
to commit the former three crimes.128
On an expedited schedule, the Supreme Court decided to
hear the saboteurs’ appeals.129 The main question was whether
prosecutors could try the saboteurs by Military Commissions or
whether they were entitled to trial by civil courts with all the
rights afforded to U.S. citizens.130
FDR made his views
abundantly clear. He told Attorney General Francis Biddle, “One
thing I want clearly understood” is that “I won’t give them
up . . . I won’t hand them to any United States Marshal armed
with a writ of habeas corpus.”131
The Supreme Court understood FDR’s position, loud and
clear. Understanding that FDR planned to execute the prisoners
no matter what decision the Supreme Court reached, it yielded to
his view and validated the trial by Military Commissions.132 The
Court first issued a short opinion rejecting the claims of Quirin
and the others.133 The Court said it would write a full opinion in
the fall, after returning from vacation.134 A few days after the
Court issued this initial opinion, the Government executed six of
the eight German saboteurs, long before the Supreme Court

Haupt, 330 U.S. at 633, 644.
Article III of the United States Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme
Court and “such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
127 See Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942) (appointing a Military
Commission to try the eight saboteurs, including Herbert Haupt).
128 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 23 (1942).
129 Id. at 19.
130 Id. at18–19, 24.
131 Andrew C. McCarthy, The End of Discretion, THE NEW CRITERION, January 2008.
132 Id. referencing JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007); see also David
J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61, 69 (1996) (describing Supreme
Court discussions during pre-argument conferences of Biddle’s view that FDR would
execute the saboteurs regardless of how the Supreme Court ruled).
133 Ex parte Quirin, 63 S. Ct. 1, 2 (1942); Louis Fisher, Military Commissions:
Problems of Authority and Practice, 24 B.U. INT’L L. J. 15, 38 (2006).
134 See Ex parte Quirin, 63 S. Ct. at 2; Fisher, supra note 133, at 38–39.
125
126
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issued its lengthier opinion.135 FDR commuted the sentence of
two saboteurs because they cooperated with the investigation.136
The Supreme Court upheld the convictions in a full opinion
that it issued the next fall.137 The Supreme Court held:
[T]he detention and trial of [the saboteurs]—ordered by the
President in the declared exercise of his powers as
Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave
public danger—are not to be set aside by the courts without
the clear conviction that they are in conflict with the
Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.138

In a unanimous opinion, the Court found no such conflict.139 The
Court determined that the President’s constitutional power to
wage war necessarily included the power to hold war crimes
trials, and punish war criminals.140 Further, Congress had
explicitly sanctioned Military Commissions in its articles of
war.141
Aside from deciding that the President could initiate
Military Commissions, the Supreme Court also discussed the
specific charges brought against the saboteurs.142 Looking to
military history, it found that wearing a uniform was central to
lawfully waging war, and that historically spies lurking around
behind enemy lines were put to death.143 The Court did not
define the outside jurisdictional boundaries of Military
Commissions, but found that clandestinely entering the United
States to wage war, without wearing a uniform, most certainly
violated the laws of war.144
In Quirin, the Supreme Court revisited Milligan and
clarified that even U.S. citizens can be brought to trial before
Military Commissions when U.S. courts are open, if they are
unlawful enemy combatants.145 The American citizen saboteur
was not insulated from being tried by a military court because he
had crossed enemy lines, which made him an unlawful enemy
belligerent.146 His father, Hans Haupt, and Anthony Cramer
received civilian trials because, although they aided the

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Davis, supra note 116, at 124.
McCarthy, supra note 131.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29–31.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 37–38.
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saboteurs, they had not crossed enemy lines and thus were not
unlawful belligerents.147 Therefore, Quirin rejected the view that
civilians are always entitled to Article III civilian trials when
civilian courts are open.148 It clarified the reach of Milligan once
and for all.
In 1946, four years after Military Commissions convicted and
executed the Nazi saboteurs, another Military Commission case
made its way to the Supreme Court.149 General Yamashita was a
commanding general of the Imperial Japanese Army in the
Philippines during WWII. He eventually surrendered to the
United States and became a POW.150 A Military Commission
tried, convicted, and sentenced him to death by hanging for
allowing his soldiers to commit brutal atrocities against people of
the U.S. and its allies.151 On over one hundred occasions, his
soldiers attacked unarmed civilians and POWs, and destroyed
public, private, and religious property.152
Yamashita’s defense at trial, and on appeal, was that he
could not be held responsible for crimes committed by his
soldiers.153 The Supreme Court disagreed, and determined that
international law permits holding commanders responsible for
“permitting [their soldiers] to commit the extensive and
widespread atrocities.”154
Justices Murphy and Rutledge
authored strongly worded dissents, criticizing the Court for
permitting “revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal
procedure for purposes of dealing with a fallen enemy
commander.”155 They argued that General Yamashita could not
be held responsible for acts without proving he specifically
committed, ordered, or condoned, the atrocities.156
Despite the spirited disagreement about whether General
Yamashita formed the requisite criminal intent to be held liable,
the Court reaffirmed Quirin and made clear that trial by Military
Commission was permissible.157 It concluded that the articles of
war, authorized by Congress, allowed Military Commissions.158

Id. at 37–38.
George Lardner, Jr., Nazi Saboteurs Captured!, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2002,
(Magazine), at 12.
149 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
150 Id. at 5.
151 Id. at 5, 13–14.
152 Id. at 14.
153 See id. at 6.
154 Id. at 14, 17.
155 Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
156 See id. at 40; Id. at 43–44 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 7–9.
158 Id. at 11.
147
148
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The Court called Military Commissions “an appropriate tribunal
for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of
war.”159
It acknowledged significant judicial deference to
Military Commissions:
If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and
condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely because
they have made a wrong decision on disputed facts. Correction of
their errors of decision is not for the courts but for the military
authorities which are alone authorized to review their decisions.160

Considering Quirin and Yamashita, the United States
entered the Global War on Terror backed by significant legal
precedent to hold Military Commissions and even to prosecute
before military courts an “enemy combatant” who “passes the
military lines.”161
IV. LAW GOVERNING MILITARY TRIBUNALS IN THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERROR
After September 11th, the President ordered the Department
of Defense to establish Military Commissions, which would try
enemy combatants for war crimes.162 President Bush patterned
his Order after Roosevelt’s order during WWII,163 which the
Supreme Court had unanimously upheld in Ex parte Quirin.164
President Bush made a few departures from FDR’s order, to give
the detainees more rights. For instance, do not apply to citizens
and the trials are public.
Just as Presidents Johnson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt had
issued Executive Orders during the Civil War and WWII eras
calling for military trials, President Bush issued an Executive
Order laying the groundwork for Military Commissions.165
President Bush’s November 13, 2001 order instructed the
Secretary of Defense to draft rules governing the Commissions.166
At a minimum, the president directed “full and fair” trials with a
Commission that decides both fact and law, admission of any
evidence having probative value to a reasonable person,
protection of classified information, conviction and sentence by a
two-thirds majority, and review of the trial record by either the
secretary of defense or the President himself.167
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
See Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942).
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 162.
Id. § 4.
Id.
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Responding to the President, the Secretary of Defense then
drafted Military Commission Order Number One, which set forth
Military Commission procedures.168 Section five, Procedures
Accorded the Accused, guaranteed the accused several rights:
A copy of charges in defendant’s language
The presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt
Detailed military defense counsel
Access to information the prosecution intends to use at trial and
any evidence tending to exculpate the defendant
Guarantees that the defendant is not required to testify against
himself, but may testify on his own behalf (the right to remain
silent)
The defendant’s right to be present except when it violates laws
governing classified information or when the defendant is
disruptive
Access to information used in sentencing
The right to present evidence and make a statement at a
sentencing hearing
Open public trials
The protection against double jeopardy, i.e., prosecutors cannot
charge defendants twice for the same crime (double jeopardy).169

Military Commission Order Number One provided
substantially greater procedural protections for detainees
captured during the Global War on Terror than the Hunter
Commission provided for Lincoln’s assassins.170 It provided
appointed legal counsel, incorporated the presumption of
innocence, guaranteed the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, ensured defendants the right to remain silent, and
protected defendants against double jeopardy (being tried twice
for the same crime).171
Military Commission Order Number One granted defendants
more rights than criminal defendants presently receive in many
European countries, which routinely accept hearsay and do not
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict.172
Further, its guarantee of “open public trials” allowed more

168 U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, Aug. 31, 2005, available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf.
169 Id. § 5.
170 See discussion supra Part I.
171 Id.
172 See generally John R. Spencer, The Concept of “European Evidence,” 4 ERA FORUM
29 (2003).
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protections that the Nazi saboteurs received in the Quirin, where
the saboteurs were tried in secret.173
In 2006, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld rejected
the rules governing President Bush’s Military Commissions by
narrowly construing Congress’ Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF).174 It found that, as a statutory matter,
Congress had not authorized Military Commissions,175 but
invited Congress to authorize them:
Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to
seek the authority he believes necessary. . . . If Congress, after
due consideration, deems it appropriate to change the
controlling statutes, in conformance with the Constitution and
other laws, it has the power and prerogative to do so.176

Congress did as the Supreme Court suggested and passed
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).177 The MCA
authorized Military Commissions and codified several procedural
protections.178 For instance, under the MCA, defendants can only
be convicted by a two-thirds majority of the Commission and for
sentences exceeding ten years, including the death penalty, a
three-fourths majority is required to convict.179 The Military
Commissions Act also adopted a robust appeals process, which
includes an internal appeal to the Convening Authority, an
appeal to the Court of Military Commission Review, an appeal to
the D.C. Circuit Court, and ultimately an appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court.180 The Military Commissions Act of 2006
represents another instance where both Congress and the
President acted in concert to authorize Military Commissions.
V. THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT DURING
A TIME OF WAR
A brief walk through time reveals that significant historical
precedent dating back to the Revolutionary War supports using
Military Commissions. It also reveals, not surprisingly, that the
procedural protections have evolved to provide substantially
more due process over time. The Hunter Commission seemed
See Lane, supra note 119.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–95 (2006).
Id.; see also Glenn Sulmasy, John Yoo & Martin Flaherty, Debate, Hamdan and
the Military Commissions Act, 155 U. PA. L. REV. (PENNUMBRA) 146, 146–47 (2007),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/sulmasy_yooflaherty.pdf.
176 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
177 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950p (Supp.
2008)).
178 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a)–(f) (Supp. 2008).
179 Id. § 949m(a), (b)(2).
180 Id. §§ 950d(b)–(d), 950g.
173
174
175
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more concerned with efficiency than with affording due process.
FDR granted more rights than the Hunter Commission offered.
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 incorporated fundamental
procedural protections, including the right to remain silent and
protection against double jeopardy.181
In all of the incidents discussed above, the President and
Congress acted in concert. But, does it matter? Is it relevant
that both democratic branches of government agree on the proper
course of action? The Supreme Court answered these questions
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.182
The year was 1951 and the U.S. was embroiled in the Korean
War. At the same time, steel companies were in a dispute with
their employees. Being unable to reach a resolution, the Steel
Union announced a nationwide strike, which would halt steel
production.183 President Truman responded by issuing Executive
Order 10340, which directed the Secretary of Commerce to
possess and operate various steel mills around the United
States.184 Based on the fact that steel was necessary for weapons
and other war materials, the President considered it within his
role as Commander in Chief to keep the steel mills operational.185
The steel companies filed suit in the District Court, claiming
that the President lacked authority to seize the steel mills and
that the seizure was not authorized by Congress.186 Writing for
the Supreme Court, Justice Black concluded, in a pithy opinion,
that the President’s actions were not sanctioned by Congress and
were not specifically authorized by the Constitution.187 It said
that seizing private property to ensure continuing production “is
a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military
authorities.”188
Justice Jackson filed a separate concurring opinion,189 which
explored the contours of Presidential power and presented the
notion that, in each instance, Presidential Power is either
strengthened or weakened by whether Congress agrees or
disagrees. Jackson said that the President’s “powers are not
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or

181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

See id. §§ 948r, 949h.
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Youngstown at 582–83.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 586–87.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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conjunction with those of Congress.”190 Justice Jackson created
three groupings to express the notion of progressive Presidential
power.191
In the first grouping, the President’s power is at its height
when he acts in accordance with Congress, whether express or
implied. In this instance, his power includes “all that he posses
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”192 In the
second grouping, Congress is silent and neither affirms nor
denies his authority, leaving the President with only his
specified, independent powers. Justice Jackson explained that
“there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority or in which its distribution is uncertain.”193
When Congress fails or refuses to act, the President’s actual
power depends on the circumstances—”imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law.”194 In the third grouping, the President acts against the
express or implied will of Congress. In this instance, his power is
at its “lowest ebb” and “he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter.”195 Presidential claim to power in this
instance must be “scrutinized with caution” because the balance
of power is at stake.196
Justice Jackson placed the President’s steel seizure in group
three, because President Truman acted contrary to the will of
Congress.197
He concluded that the President’s powers as
Commander in Chief were not large enough to encompass
controlling internal affairs of the country, including seizing the
steel mills,198 particularly because the Constitution delegates to
Congress the power to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide
and maintain a Navy” that leaves Congress, not the President,
with the burden of supplying the armed forces.199 In this case,
Congress specified procedures for seizing private property; and
the President, without any authority, flouted those procedures.200
For these reasons, the Supreme Court did not sanction the
President’s decision to seize the steel mills.201
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id. at 635.
Id. at 635–38.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 639–40.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 585, 587–88.
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The Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld adopted Justice
Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown, and reiterated that a
President’s authority is “at its maximum” when he acts in concert
with Congress and at its “lowest ebb” when he acts incompatibly
with Congress.202 In 2008, the Supreme Court again reaffirmed
Youngstown’s twilight analysis in Medellin v. Texas,203 quoting
from Youngstown: “[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb.”204 It went on to say, “The President’s
authority to act must come from an act of Congress or the
Constitution itself.”205 Both Hamdan and Medellin make clear
that the twilight analysis in Youngstown is still the law today.
But, sandwiched between Hamdan and Medellin, is
Boumediene v. Bush, where a divided Supreme Court did not
follow the Youngstown analysis but instead invalidated a joint
war time decision by Congress and the President.206
The Boumediene case concerned the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 (“DTA”), a set of procedures passed by Congress that
governed status hearings of detainees captured abroad in the
War on Terror.207 The DTA gave the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit “exclusive jurisdiction” to review the
Military’s Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”).208 In
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the DTA did
not apply to pending cases.209 Congress responded to Hamdan by
amending the law to clarify that it did apply to pending cases.210
That is, Congress made clear that the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, and only the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit would have jurisdiction to hear
CSRT appeals stemming back to September 11, 2001.211
Rejecting the judgment of Congress and the Executive, the
Supreme Court in Boumediene invalidated the DTA. But the
Court was sharply divided. The dissent criticized the Court for
decreeing that there was “no good reason to accept the judgment
of the other two branches” and it argued that the court was not
competent to “second-guess the judgment of Congress and the
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
Id. at 1368.
Id.
206 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
207 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. 2241).
208 Id.
209 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
210 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
211 Id.
202
203
204
205
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President.”212 It went on to opine that the Court “must leave
undisturbed the considered judgment of the coequal branches.”213
In Boumediene, the Court stood firm against the other two
branches of government, and to Justice Jackson’s test articulated
in Youngstown.
VI. PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF QUIRIN,
YOUNGSTOWN, HAMDAN & BOUMEDIENE
In November 2008, Barack Obama was elected President of
the United States. On January 22, 2009, shortly after taking
office, President Obama issued an Executive Order closing
(eventually) the United States military detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay and halting the Military Commissions
presently underway.214 His order called for a committee to
review whether and how the detainees should be prosecuted.215
The Executive Order declares that it “shall be implemented
consistent with applicable law.”216 However, the present Military
Commissions are not a creature of the Executive Branch. They
exist in the present format because of an act of Congress.217 The
new Presidential Order commands the impossible. How can an
order to disregard a federal law be consistent with that law?
The twilight zone test set out in Justice Jackson’s concurring
opinion in Youngstown, and adopted in Hamdan and Medellin,
makes clear that the President may not unilaterally stop Military
Commissions and craft his own, novel procedures, outside of the
democratic process. Because Congress has already spoken, and
has passed a federal statute that governs Military Commissions,
the President’s power is at its “lowest ebb.” When President
Truman unconstitutionally refused to follow the Taft Hartley
Act, and attempted to substitute his own procedures,218 the Court
enjoined Truman’s attempted seizure of the steel mills.

Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2296 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2297.
Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1893.pdf.
215 Id. § 4(c)(3):
Determination of Prosecution. In accordance with United States law, the cases
of individuals detained at Guantánamo not approved for release or transfer
shall be evaluated to determine whether the Federal Government should seek
to prosecute the detained individuals for any offenses they may have
committed, including whether it is feasible to prosecute such individuals before
a court established pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution,
and the Review participants shall in turn take the necessary and appropriate
steps based on such determinations.
216 Id. § 8(b).
217
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
218 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
212
213
214
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President Obama now refuses to follow the Military Commissions
Act, and substitute his own, yet to be determined, procedures.
The problem is that a federal statute already governs these
procedures.
Justice Burton’s concurrence in Youngstown reflected Justice
Jackson’s twilight zone analysis. Burton observed that “[i]n the
case before us, Congress authorized a procedure which the
President declined to follow.”219 Justice Burton further stated
that “[t]he controlling fact here is that Congress, within its
constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for the
President specific procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in
meeting the present type of emergency.”220 He went on to
conclude that, under those circumstances, the President’s order
“invaded the jurisdiction of Congress. It violated the essence of
the principle of the separation of governmental powers.”221
President Obama’s Order halting Military Commissions does the
same thing and should receive the same treatment as President
Truman’s Executive Order.
President Truman’s steel seizure case involved private
property. The seizures impacted U.S. citizens and were not akin
to decisions made on the battlefield.
Yet those factual
distinctions are constitutionally irrelevant. Can the President’s
power as Commander in Chief override a specific federal statute
that governs how the President can conduct Military
Commissions? The President does not have more authority
under his Commander in Chief role to act contrary to federal
statute when it comes to holding Military Commissions in a time
of war. In Youngstown, the Court acknowledged a long line of
cases that upheld “broad powers” for Commanders during a time
of war.222 But, it distinguished those cases:
Such cases need not concern us here. Even though “theatre of war” be
an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our
constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private
property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production.223

Under Quirin, Yamashita and Youngstown, the Commander
in Chief’s role during an active war was expansive. However, the
Supreme Court in Hamdan found that the Youngstown twilight
analysis does apply to a President’s decision to hold Military

219
220
221
222
223

Id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring).
Id. at 660.
Id.
See id. at 587.
Id.
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Commissions during war-time.224 It said that President Bush’s
Executive Order calling for Military Commissions (which was
identical to FDR’s order in Quirin) now required specific
Congressional endorsement.225
It found that Congress’s
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) did not
clearly grant authority for Military Commissions.226 As noted
above, the Hamdan case led to Congress to enact the Military
Commissions Act of 2006. That law consequently ties the hands
of the Commander in Chief. That is why President Obama
cannot waive away the statute by issuing an Executive Order.
Before Hamdan, no Congressional statute existed that
governed Military Commissions; Quirin was the law, and it
accepted that the establishment of Military Commissions was
within the President’s discretion. After Hamdan, however,
Congress drafted a federal law governing Military Commissions
in the Global War on Terror. Given Youngstown’s twilight
analysis, President Obama’s power to adopt rules for Military
Commissions inconsistent with the Military Commissions Act is
now at its lowest ebb. The Court has never invalidated the
Military Commissions Act.
While the Supreme Court has definitely pruned the
Commander in Chief’s power during a time of war, it has not left
President Obama without a remedy. When the U.S. entered the
War on Terror in 2001, Quirin was the law, and the President
enjoyed extensive war time power, including the wide discretion
regarding Military Commissions. Youngstown had limited the
President’s war-time power in some instances, by finding that
the President did not have power to take private possession of
property, but had left Quirin intact.
In 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court applied
Justice Jackson’s twilight zone test in Youngstown to evaluate
Military Commissions. It found that the President’s Executive
Order calling for Military Commissions required specific
endorsement from Congress—something not required under
Quirin. It invited Congress to pass legislation endorsing the
President’s play for Military Commissions.227
The President has only one alternative. Just as the Court in
Hamdan invited Congress to endorse President Bush’s Military
Commissions plan, Congress can endorse President Obama’s
plan. President Obama must persuade Congress to amend (or do
224
225
226
227

See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2006).
Id. at 595.
Id. at 594.
See discussion supra Part IV.
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away with) the Military Commissions Act of 2006. But, he
cannot act alone. Disregarding existing, controlling federal law
all together runs afoul of Youngstown and Hamdan and violates
“the essence of the principle of separation of powers,” just as
Truman violated the separation of powers in the Youngstown
steel seizure context.228 What impact the Boumediene case may
have on President Obama’s decisions regarding Military
Commissions remains to be seen.
VII. PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS & UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE
President Obama’s Executive Order halting military trials
may amount to unlawful command influence. President Obama
directed the Secretary of Defense to refrain from charging any
additional detainees under the Military Commissions Act of
2006, and halted trials already underway.229 His order also
declared: “Nothing in this order shall prejudice the authority of
the Secretary of Defense to determine the disposition of any
detainees not covered by this order.”230 But saying it does not
make it so.
Because meddling commanders threaten the independence of
Military Trials, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
makes certain levels of command influence illegal.231 It is a
punishable crime, and (among other things) prohibits any
Commander from influencing an action of any military
tribunal.232
Congress included the same prohibition in the recently
enacted Rules for Military Commissions. Under the Military
Commissions Act, it is unlawful for any official to improperly
influence the action of Military Commissions in the Global War
on Terror.233 In fact, the Military Commissions Rule is actually
228 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 660 (1952) (Burton,
J., concurring).
229 Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). Section 7 states:
Military Commissions. The Secretary of Defense shall immediately take steps
sufficient to ensure that during the pendency of the Review described in
section 4 of this order, no charges are sworn, or referred to a Military
Commission under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the Rules for
Military Commissions, and that all proceedings of such Military Commissions
to which charges have been referred but in which no judgment has been
rendered, and all proceedings pending in the United States Court of Military
Commission Review, are halted.
Id. § 7, at 4899.
230 Id. § 8, at 4899.
231 See Rules for Courts Martial, Manual for Courts-Martial, pt. II, ch. I, R. 104, at
II-4 (2008), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf [hereinafter
Rules for Courts-Martial].
232 See id.
233 See Rules for Military Commissions, Manual for Military Commissions, pt II, ch.
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more broad than the Courts Martial Rule because it covers “all
persons” and specifies that “no person may attempt” to
unlawfully, or by unauthorized means, influence the Military
Commission.234 The Courts Martial Rule only applies to “all
persons subject to the code.”235
Courts consistently recognize the deleterious impact of
unlawful command influence on military trials. One court called
it the “mortal enemy of military justice.”236 Another referred to it
as “a malignancy that eats away at the fairness of our military
justice system.”237 Military Courts have interpreted the crime of
unlawful command influence to include even the appearance of
unlawful command influence.238
Tests include “whether a
reasonable member of the public . . . would have a loss of
confidence in the military justice system and believe it to be
unfair.”239 Another query is whether the command influence
placed “intolerable strain on public perception” of the military
justice system.”240 Figuratively speaking, the test for unlawful
command influence asks whether the Commander was “brought
into the deliberation room”—whether he controlled the trial or
the court.241
After President Obama’s order to halt military trials, most
judges and prosecutors in Guantanamo Bay dutifully complied
although the statute gives no president the power to order
prosecutors to ask for, or order a judge to grant, a continuance.242
They accepted the unlawful command influence.
Prosecutors filed motions to stop the trials, and judges
granted them, with one lone exception.243 Army Colonel Judge
James Pohl, who was presiding over the prosecution of alNashiri, the alleged mastermind of The Cole bombing in 2000,

I, R. 104, at II-8 (2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/
The%20Manual%20for%20Military%20Commissions.pdf [hereinafter Rules for Military
Commissions].
234 Id. R. 104(a)(2) (emphasis added).
235 See Rules for Courts-Martial, R. 104(a)(2).
236 Teresa K. Hollingsworth, Unlawful Command Influence, 39 A.F. L. REV. 261, 263
(1996) (citing United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 394 (C.M.A. 1986)).
237 Id. (citing United States v. Gleason, 39 M.J. 776, 782 (A.C.M.R. 1994)).
238 See id. at 264–65 (citing United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 590 (N-M
C.M.R.1990)).
239 United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 590 (N-M.C.M.R. 1990).
240 United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 374 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
241 Allen, 31 M.J. at 590.
242 Carol J. Williams, Judge Says He’s Forging Ahead, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at
A9.
243 Id.
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refused to stop the trial.244
Pohl said that the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 governed the proceedings, and stated
that, “[t]he public interest in a speedy trial will be harmed by the
delay in the arraignment.”245 Pohl also stated: “The Commission
is bound by the law as it currently exists not as it may change in
the future.”246
Judge Pohl pointed out that the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 gave the military judges “sole
authority” to grant delays once charges had been referred for
trial.247
On the heels of his refusal, the Pentagon issued a statement.
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said that “Pohl would soon be
told to comply with Obama’s executive order.”248 He went on to
explain, “all I can really tell you is that this department will be in
full compliance with the president’s executive order. There’s [sic]
no if, ands or buts about that.”249 He then added, “while that
executive order is in force and effect, trust me that there will be
no proceedings continuing, down at Gitmo, with Military
Commissions.”250 As predicted, a few days later, the charges
against al-Nashiri were dropped.251 Colonel Pohl was not
involved in that decision.252 Normally, unlawful command
influence occurs in the shadows. This time it occurred while the
Pentagon celebrated it in a press release.
These Pentagon orders make clear that President Obama
was not just “brought into the deliberation room,” but that he
blocked the deliberation room door and sent the judge and jurors
home. The Executive Order left no room for Judge Pohl to
exercise judicial discretion or to issue rulings in a case before
him. This interference undermined the integrity of the judicial
system and is precisely why the military has laws prohibiting
unlawful command influence.

244 Id.; Military Judge Refuses to Halt Trial of USS Cole Bombing Suspect,
FOXNEWS, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/01/29/military-judgerefuses-halt-trial-uss-cole-bombing-suspect (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
245 Ruling on Government Motion to Continue Arraignment, United States v. AlNashiri, (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2009/
DelayArraignment_MJ.pdf.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Williams, supra note 242.
249 Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Defense News Briefing
with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon (Jan. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4345.
250 Id.
251 Charges Dropped in USS Cole Terror Trial, MSNBC, Feb. 5, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29042139 (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
252 Id.
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Military Courts have repeatedly held that almost any
interference with military trials amounts to unlawful command
influence.
For instance, one court found that a hospital
commander committed unlawful command influence when he
criticized witnesses (after the military trial was over) for
testifying on behalf of alleged drug offenders.253
Another court held that an Army General committed
unlawful command influence when he told his subordinate
officers that they should not recommend a trial or bad conduct
discharge for a soldier, and then testify that that same convicted
solder is a “good soldier” at the sentencing hearing.254 The
General believed that the two positions were inconsistent. The
court found unlawful command influence and said: “ . . . in this
area [unlawful command influence] the band of permissible
activity by the commander is narrow, and the risks of
overstepping its boundaries are great. Interference with the
discretionary functions of subordinates is particularly
hazardous.”255
In another case, after a military judge ruled leniently in
three cases, the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, and
other senior JAG Officers, launched an informal inquiry into
whether the judge had been subjected to unlawful command
influence by his chain of command. The U.S. Court of Military
Appeals barred such inquiries and said that only investigations
that were “outside the adversary process” and “made by an
independent judicial Commission established in strict accordance
with the guidance contained in section 9.1(a) of the AGA
Standards . . . ” were permitted. The court was concerned that
the inquiry itself could amount to unlawful command
influence.256
In United States v. Lewis, a military prosecutor and his
supervising lawyer (the Staff Judge Advocate, or SJA)
aggressively sought to recuse a Marine Corps judge on the
grounds that the judge had a personal relationship with the
defendant’s lawyer (who was a former Marine). The prosecutor
alleged that the judge and civilian defense counsel had interacted
socially, even while the trial was ongoing.257 The prosecutor
introduced evidence that the military judge and defense counsel
were seen together at a play, while the case was ongoing.258
253
254
255
256
257
258

United States v. Sullivan, 26 M.J. 442 (CMA 1988).
United States v. Treakle, 18 M.J. 646 (A.C.M.R. 1984).
Id. at 653.
United States v. Ledbetter, 2 M.J. 37, 42 (C.M.A. 1976).
United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 408 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
Id. at 409.
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When initially questioned about attending the play with defense
counsel, the Judge failed to disclose that interaction. Later, she
explained that it had “slipped [her] mind.”259 She then conceded
that she and the defense counsel had “occasional social
interaction with no discussions of any military trials pending
before me.”260
In addition to the social relationship, the prosecutor also
pointed out that the defense counsel had a practice of sending
copies of e-mails about pending cases to this particular judge and
that the defense counsel had previously expressed a preference
for this military judge in other cases.261
The prosecutor also introduced evidence that the judge had
been voir dired about her personal relationship with defense
counsel in several other cases.262 In one instance, after being voir
dired by the prosecutor in an earlier case, the judge told a
colleague that she felt she had been put “through an inquisition”
and that “it would take . . . a few days to get back on good terms
with the government.”263 The prosecutor introduced this prior
statement as evidence of partiality toward this particular defense
counsel.264
The military judge at first denied the prosecution’s motion to
recuse. The prosecutor sought a three-day continuance to
determine whether the government would appeal the ruling. The
judge denied that request. The prosecutor then amended the
request and asked for only a three hour continuance in order to

Id.
Id.
Id. at 408–09.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 408.
The prosecution’s motion for refusal went as follows:
Ma’am, at this time taken all of the facts that have come to light during this
inquiry, your previous involvement with the companion cases, having worked
with Colonel [JS] in the past, having a social relationship limited to
interactions at the barn, as well as the fact that defense counsel in the Neff
case apparently received statements from the assistant civilian defense counsel
expressing in the Scamahorn case displeasure with the way that you had been
voir dired in the Curiel case; also the fact that civilian defense counsel in this
case has made a habit of CC’ing you on electronic mail messages which
contained disputed and contested substantial issues relating to suborning
perjury, discovery issues, and making recommendations to you as to what
would be an appropriate resolution for failure to comply with pretrial
milestones: All of that taken together, ma’am, would you agree that creates an
appearance of impartiality [sic] that a reasonable person might perceive with
respect to this case, ma’am?
Id. at 408–09.
259
260
261
262
263
264
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seek a stay of the proceedings. The judge denied that request,
too.265
Ultimately, after consulting with other judges in the circuit,
the judge changed her mind and recused herself.266 She stated,
“I’m emotional about this”267 and explained that she was
“mortally disappointed in the professional community that is
willing to draw such slanderous conclusions from so little
information.”268 She went on to explain, “I now find myself
second guessing every decision in this case. Did I favor the
government to protect myself from further assault? Did I favor
the accused to retaliate against the government[?]”269 She held
prosecutors responsible for her inability to be objective, stating
“ . . . my emotional reaction to the slanderous conduct of the SJA
has invaded my deliberative process on the motions.”270
After the sitting judge recused herself, the military assigned
a new judge, LTC FD.271 Incredibly, he accepted the case only to
almost immediately recuse himself, too. What were his reasons
for recusal? “The manner in which [trial counsel] handled the
voir dire in this case particularly offends me.”272
He
characterized the SJA’s voir dire of the former judge as a “crass,
sarcastic, and scurrilous characterization of the social interaction
between Major [CW] and Ms. [JS] . . . ” He explained that he
could “neither understand nor set aside” the “ignorance,
prejudice, and paranoia on the part of the government.”273
But, how, exactly did the diligent voir dire of a former judge
prejudice the present judge? It seems that the military judges
mounted a united, public, front against voir dire directed at
them. One can only understand this as a warning to JAG
prosecutors that judges are off limits. Arguably, it is this united
front that taints the fairness of military trials—not prosecutors
doing their jobs.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
held that the prosecutor and the SJA’s diligent attempts to
recuse the judge amounted to unlawful command influence.274
Without citing any evidence that the prosecutor, or SJA, were

265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274

Id. at 409–10.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 410–11.
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 414–15.
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actually influenced by their chain of command, or acted out of
anything but professional diligence, the Court of Appeals found
unlawful command influence. It said:
[t]o the extent that the SJA, a representative of the convening
authority, advised the trial counsel in the voir dire assault on the
military judge and to the extent that his unprofessional behavior as a
witness and inflammatory testimony created a bias in the military
judge, the facts establish clearly that there was unlawful command
influence on the court-martial.275

That is—the Court simply held that if the prosecutors acted
as puppets for the Command then unlawful command influence
occurred. But, it failed to answer the dispositive question of
whether the Commander was at all involved.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed with the
lower court, also without citing any evidence that the prosecutors
were motivated by any commander. It simply said, “a reasonable
observer would have significant doubt about the fairness of this
court-martial in light of the Government’s conduct with respect
to MAJ CW [the military judge].”276 It did not explain why a
reasonable observer would reach such a conclusion.
It is unclear how a prosecutor aggressively seeking to recuse
a judge, whom the prosecutor reasonably believed was biased,
amounts to unlawful command influence. How would it lead one
to believe that the procedures were not fair? In fact, the opposite
is true. One would think that a military prosecutor facing off
against a military judge in open court demonstrates that the
proceedings are fair; that they are not orchestrated; that both
prosecutors and defense counsel diligently represent their clients,
despite the fact that they all work for the military.
Whether one agrees, or disagrees, with the holding in Lewis,
one cannot deny the fact that its holding would prohibit
President Obama from stopping military trials already
underway.
If minor interferences with a trial amount to
unlawful command influence, then surely halting a trial
altogether qualifies as well. If the mere theoretical possibility
that a Commander encouraged a prosecutor to recuse a judge
amounts to unlawful interference, then certainly a President
actually halting a trial and involuntarily removing the judge
qualifies as well. Is there any greater “interference” than
ordering a judge to stop a trial?
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Ironically, one of the sitting judges [Judge Susan Crawford]
who decided the Lewis277 case later yielded to, and facilitated,
President Obama’s order to halt Military Commissions that were
already underway in Guantanamo Bay. Only a few months after
Lewis, Secretary Robert Gates designated Judge Crawford as the
convening authority for Military Commissions.278 Her position as
the convening authority meant that she would supervise the
office of Military Commissions, review and approve charges, and
appoint members of the Military Commission, along with other
duties.279
When Judge Pohl would not yield to President Obama’s
order to halt the trials, Judge Crawford intervened and
dismissed the charges against al-Nashiri, who was the alleged
mastermind of the Cole Bombing.280 The case was not before her.
The same Pentagon official who said approximately one week
before the dismissal that “Pohl would soon be told to comply”
confirmed that Crawford yielded to the President’s order. He
stated, “[i]t was her decision, but it reflects the fact that the
president had issued an executive order which mandates that the
Commissions be halted . . . .”281 On the heels of her decision in
Lewis, in which she took a rigid stand against unlawful command
influence with relatively weak facts, she yielded to President
Obama’s order to halt military trials.282
That is—the same Judge who believes that diligent voir dire
directed at military judges amounts to unlawful command
influence, holds different, and inconsistent, views when the
command influence originates with a sitting President. The
precise reason for the inconsistency is unclear. However, one
reasonable explanation for the inconsistency is that, perhaps,
Judge Crawford herself was a victim of unlawful command
influence. That is—perhaps she can identify unlawful command
influence, but she cannot resist it when the order comes from the
highest commander—the President and Commander in Chief.
Indeed, that is why the Military prohibits unlawful command
influence, and defines it broadly.

277 Id. at 406; see also News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Seasoned judge
Tapped to head Detainee Trials, www.defenselink.mil/REleases/
Reelase.aspx?ReleaseID=10493.
278 News Release, supra note 277.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Charges Dropped in USS Cole Terror Trial, MSNBC, Feb. 5, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29042139 (last visited Mar. 25, 2009), quoting Geoff
Morrell.
282 Id.

ROTUNDA

486

10/14/2009 6:37 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 12:449

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court criticized
President Bush for changing the rules governing Military
Commissions after the trials were already underway. It said that
changing the rules “at the whim of the Executive” was
“irregular.”283 Surely, if the Supreme Court thinks that changing
the rules mid-trial is unfair, it would also conclude that halting
the trials all together in violation of a governing federal statute is
also unfair.
CONCLUSION
Over time, the procedures that govern military trials have
evolved to provide substantially greater due process.
For
instance, the Hunter Commission, which tried Lincoln’s
assassins, afforded defendants few procedural protections, FDR
offered more protections and the Guantanamo Bay Military
Commissions afford defendants even greater procedural
protections. These protections now include the right to remain
silent, protections against double jeopardy, appointed counsel,
and extensive appellate opportunities, including an appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
But, despite the evolution of procedural protections, history
shows that Presidents nonetheless have consistently interfered
with Military Commissions. For instance, President Johnson
disregarded the Hunter Commission’s plea for clemency to spare
Mary Surratt’s life, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and
ordered her immediately executed. During the War of 1812,
President Jackson disregarded a Military Commission’s acquittal
of a defendant and ordered the defendant to remain in jail.
During WWII, FDR made it known to the Supreme Court that he
planned to execute the Nazi saboteurs, no matter what the Court
decided in the Quirin case. The Court yielded to his authority
and validated the findings of the Military Commission.
In the Global War on Terror, President Obama has halted
Military Commissions in violation of the Military Commissions
Act, and possibly in violation of the prohibition against unlawful
command influence. Executive interference with military trials
undermines their legitimacy and cuts against the evolution of
procedural protections. What good are procedural protections if
the Executive, acting alone, can undo them? What good are
independent judges when a President can unseat them, or order
cases before them to be dismissed?
What is historically different about what is occurring today
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 n.65 (2006).
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is that the Supreme Court is taking a more active role in war
time matters to police Military Commissions. In Boumediene, it
stood firm against the President, even though he acted in concert
with Congress. In Hamdan, it found that President Bush’s
Executive Order calling for Military Commissions did not grant
authority for them—despite the fact that it had previously found,
in Quirin, that FDR’s virtually identical order did. It invited
Congress to pass laws specifically authorizing Military
Commissions. But, when Congress did that, the Supreme Court
in Boumediene invalidated some aspects of those rules.
What impact Boumediene will have on President Obama’s
decisions, and on future Presidential decisions, remains to be
seen. Will its new level of involvement help to curtail unlawful
command influence with Military Commissions? Perhaps, but we
cannot know for sure. One thing is clear: the Supreme Court’s
involvement in war time decisions stands in stark contrast to the
way it responded in previous wars, including during the Civil
War and World War II. Only time will tell whether the Supreme
Court’s increased involvement regarding Military Commissions is
for better or for worse; or whether unlawful command influence
will continue to be a constant feature of Military Commissions.

